Implications of Bohmian quantum ontology for psychopathology by Pylkkänen, Paavo
NeuroQuantology | March 2010 | Vol 8 | Issue 1 | Page 37‐48 
Pylkkänen P.,Implications of Bohmian quantum ontology for psychopathology  
ISSN 1303 5150                                           www.neuroquantology.com 
 
37
  Article ?
   
Implications of Bohmian  
Quantum Ontology for Psychopathology  
Paavo Pylkkänen 
Abstract 
This article discusses the prospects of quantum psychiatry from a Bohmian point of
view, which provides an ontological interpretation of quantum theory, and extends 
such ontology to  include mind.   At first, we discuss the more general relevance of 
quantum  theory  to  psychopathology.  The  basic  idea  is  that  because  quantum
theory emphasizes the role of wholeness, it might be relevant to psychopathology, 
where breakdown of unity in the mental domain is a key feature.  We then discuss
the  role  of  information  in  psychopathology,  and  consider  the  connections  with
quantum theory in this area. In particular, we discuss David Bohm’s notion of active 
information, which arises  in the ontological  interpretation of quantum theory, and
is  suggested  to play a  fundamental  role as  the bridge between mind and matter.
Some such bridge is needed if we are to understand how subtle mental properties
are able to influence more manifest physical properties in the brain (all the way to
the molecular and possibly microtubular  level), and how changes  in those possibly
quantum‐level physical processes are able  to  influence higher cognitive  functions.
We  also  consider  the  implications  of  the  notion  of  active  information  for 
psychopathology.  The  prospects  of  implementing  the  Bohmian  scheme  in
neuroquantal terms are  then briefly considered. Finally, we discuss some possible
therapeutic  implications  of  Bohm’s  approach  to  information  and  the  relation  of 
mind and matter. 
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1. Introduction1 
The aim of this article is to provide a sketch 
of a further perspective on quantum 
psychiatry, alongside other articles in this 
volume (Globus, 2010; Mender, 2010; Woolf 
et al., 2010).  Before presenting this 
perspective let me, however, make some 
brief comments on these other articles. 
I think Mender’s (2010) article is a 
useful overview and raises the question of 
the need for “quantum psychiatry” in a 
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powerful way.  Some of the ideas seem still 
fairly condensed and I hope that in future 
research this approach will be further spelled 
out and clarified so as to make the prospect 
of the emerging field of “quantum 
psychiatry” even more attractive and 
plausible to a wider audience.   
Globus (2010) offers us an ambitious 
attempt to explain certain neuropsychiatric 
disorders (such as thought insertion) in 
terms of thermofield brain dynamics (TBD).  
The key new idea in Globus’s approach is 
self-tuning: “Self-tuning from all levels 
functionally attunes memory for the 
convolution with sensory input. 
Consciousness (or existence) is the best 
match of self-tuned memory with sensory 
input…”. Self-tuning can, however, “go 
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wrong”, and this opens up an entirely new 
way of understanding “splitting” in 
psychiatric disorders:  “…if self-tuning were 
split, fragmented, dis-integrated, …it would 
be as if two discrepant images were 
simultaneously explicated from a hologram 
to which they had previously been serially 
enfolded.”   This viewpoint can be 
summarized as follows: “TBD offers a new 
way of understanding schizophrenic 
splitting: as integration failure of the self-
tuning function.” 
Globus’s paper provides us with an 
elegant discussion of psychiatric disorders in 
terms of disorders of “self-tuning”.  He also 
applies this scheme to radically rethink the 
clinical classification found in the diagnostic 
and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(DSM). I shall, however, not enter into a 
detailed discussion of Globus’s scheme here.  
One of the reasons is that the underlying 
thermofield brain dynamics is very complex, 
and I am not in a position to fully evaluate it.  
However, I also have a feeling that there 
exists a simpler way to develop a quantum 
ontology, proposed by David Bohm, and that 
it would be very useful for any “quantum 
psychiatry” to also be aware of this 
alternative. This is not to deny the potential 
value of the TBD scheme, but rather to 
remind that, given the inherent difficulty of 
quantum theory, and thus of any quantum 
psychiatry, we ought to give proper attention 
to the simpler schemes, as well as to the 
more complex ones.  In the end, the various 
schemes are likely to complement each 
other, and each can play a role in unfolding 
the full meaning of any “quantum 
psychiatry”. 
Woolf et al., (2010) provide a 
fascinating account of the possible role of 
microtubule dysfunction in mental illness.  
Given that microtubules are widely 
speculated to be plausible sites for quantum 
effects in the brain, there is a very concrete 
connection to “quantum psychiatry” in this 
paper.  I am not in a position to evaluate 
Woolf et al.’s proposals in any detail.  
However, I will make some suggestions 
about how Bohm’s ontological scheme might 
connect with their discussion. 
What I want to do in the rest of this 
article is to discuss the prospects of 
“quantum psychiatry” from what might be 
called a “Bohmian” point of view, where the 
emphasis is upon trying to provide a 
coherent ontological interpretation of 
quantum theory, and to extend this ontology 
to include mind.  My discussion is tentative, 
for although I am quite familiar with the 
general field of consciousness studies, 
especially philosophy of mind, my knowledge 
of psychopathology is very limited. For the 
purpose of writing this article I have studied 
some recent reviews of the field, but I 
apologize in advance if the discussion below 
is too simplistic from the psychopathological 
point of view.  In any case, I have found it 
personally rewarding to consider the 
prospects of the relevance of quantum theory 
to psychopathology.  I would like to thank 
the authors of the other articles in this 
special issue for opening up a whole new 
dimension of thinking. 
I will start by discussing the very 
general, indirect relevance which quantum 
theory might have to psychopathology 
(section 2).  This has to do with the new 
general world-view that quantum theory and 
relativity seem to demand.  An important 
feature of this world-view is wholeness, a 
theme relevant to psychopathology, where 
breakdown of unity in the mental domain 
seems to be a key feature.  I will then discuss 
the role of information in psychopathology, 
and consider whether there are relevant 
connections with quantum theory in this 
area (section 3). In particular, I will discuss 
David Bohm’s notion of active information 
which arises in the ontological interpretation 
of quantum theory, and is suggested to play a 
fundamental role as the bridge between 
mind and matter.  Some such bridge is 
needed if we are to understand how mental 
processes are able to influence physical 
processes in the brain (all the way to the 
molecular and possibly microtubular level), 
and how changes in those possibly quantum-
level physical processes are able to influence 
higher cognitive functions.  After presenting 
Bohm’s notion of active information, I will 
briefly consider its possible implications for 
psychopathology (section 4). The prospects 
of implementing the Bohmian scheme in 
neuroquantal terms is then briefly 
considered (section 5). Finally, I will discuss 
some possible therapeutic implications of 
Bohm’s approach to information and the 
relation of mind and matter (section 6). 
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2. Wholeness 
It is a fairly common idea that health in 
general and mental health in particular are 
connected with wholeness. As Bohm often 
noted, this is also indicated by considering 
the etymological meanings of some of the 
relevant terms: 
“…the word ’health’ in English is based 
on an Anglo-Saxon word ’hale’ meaning 
’whole’: that is, to be healthy is to be 
whole, which is … roughly the equivalent 
of the Hebrew ‘shalem’. Likewise, the 
English ‘holy’ is based on the same root 
as ‘whole’. All of this indicates that man 
has sensed always that wholeness or 
integrity is an absolute necessity to make 
life worth living. Yet, over the ages, he 
has generally lived in fragmentation”.  
(Bohm, 1980; p.3) 
Mental disorders often have to do 
with the breakdown of wholeness or unity, in 
one way or another (Globus, 2010; Stephens 
and Graham, 2007). One important general 
implication of quantum theory and relativity 
is that they underline the primacy of 
wholeness, a primacy that to some extent has 
been lost in the emphasis upon the 
mechanistic approach that classical physics 
has helped to reinforce, and which has 
spread to and been influential in other 
domains, such as the biological, 
psychological and the social, including 
medicine and psychiatry. In the 
psychological domain the mechanistic 
emphasis reveals itself in the tendency to 
give supreme importance to the self as a 
separate enduring entity, interacting fairly 
mechanically with other such selves.  In the 
neurobiological domain mechanism reveals 
itself in the assumption that psychological 
phenomena can in the end be fully 
understood in terms of the interaction of 
neural elements.  In this whole approach, it 
is presupposed that the basic realities at each 
level are entities that interact more or less 
mechanically.  Mental and physical illness 
can then be seen as a failure of such 
connections and interactions between these 
separate entities that are considered as 
primary. 
A holistic world view inspired by 
quantum and relativity takes undivided 
wholeness in flowing movement as primary 
(Bohm, 1980).  Separate entities (particles) 
arise from such movement as a result of 
certain enfolded and generative orders that 
prevail in the movement.  Such entities are 
not separate substances but relatively 
autonomous sub-wholes, like vortices in a 
stream. Speaking in very general terms, this 
is strongly analogous to the notion that what 
is primary in the mental aspect is a stream of 
consciousness, out of which emerge 
relatively autonomous entities such as 
thoughts, beliefs, sensations, perceptions, 
intentions, desires, emotions, feelings, and 
selves. In this view mental health is 
essentially connected to the undivided 
wholeness and coherence in the underlying 
stream of consciousness; mental disorder 
results in part when this wholeness is lost for 
one reason or the other.  For example, one 
might give too much emphasis to certain of 
the various divisions that naturally arise in 
the stream, thus setting the stage for the 
emergence of conflicts between such 
separate parts of the mind.  
Of course, analysis into parts can 
work very well up to a point as an 
explanatory strategy both in the 
psychological domain and in the underlying 
neurophysiological processes. However, it is 
important not to lose sight of the underlying 
undivided wholeness in flowing movement 
in our stream of consciousness.  Quantum 
theory and relativity, and the general world 
view arising from them (and possibly even 
the more specific “neuroquantal” models), 
can play an important role in helping to give 
attention to this wholeness.  Thus, one of the 
more general underlying messages of any 
“quantum psychiatry” could be that we need 
to consider the importance of such 
wholeness for mental and physical health. 
A holistic perspective can also 
radically change the way we understand the 
relationship between the individual and his 
or her social and physical environment.  In a 
mechanistic view, we assume that society can 
be reduced to individuals in interaction.  In a 
holistic view, we say that each individual is a 
manifestation of the whole, which includes 
society and the physical environment, 
information about which is enfolded in the 
memory of the individual.  Thus, we no 
longer reduce society to a group of 
individuals, but rather regard the individual 
as a state of the whole. This turns the 
mechanistic view upside down (cf. Bohm, 
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1978).  I think this is also important when 
considering psychiatric disorders.  When we 
are feeling psychologically unwell, we easily 
see the disorder as a property of our 
separately existing self, which in turn can 
make us feel worse and even more isolated 
from other people.  However, if the holistic 
view is correct, our mental disorders are 
likely often to be manifestations of the state 
of the social groups in which we participate.  
Suffering is universal.  This is nicely 
captured in a Sikh story about the man in a 
village who one day climbed to the roof of his 
house, and to his amazement saw that many 
people in the village, out in their backyards, 
seemed to be suffering in very similar ways 
that he himself was.  If the holistic view is 
correct, it implies that an important part of 
the efforts to maintain mental health ought 
to be directed to detecting various kinds of 
incoherence at the social level (e.g. in 
practises and failures of communication), 
instead of an exclusive focus upon the 
individual, whose suffering to some extent is 
just a manifestation of the social incoherence 
(Bohm, 1995). 
 
3. Information 
Many mental disorders can be understood in 
terms of failures in the flow of information 
and in the response to information.  In 
hallucination one “…mistakes one sort of 
mental event, an imagined experience, for 
another, a veridical sense perception” 
(Stephens and Graham 2007; p.199).  For 
example, a person might believe that he sees 
a giant rabbit in front of him.  The 
hallucinatory subject “misattributes his or 
her self-generated private events to a source 
external to him- or herself” (Slade and 
Bentall, 1988, quoted in Stephens and 
Graham, 2007; p.199).  Thus, in 
hallucination certain information is missing 
(i.e. information that the given mental even 
is self-generated), and as a consequence 
certain mistaken information prevails (i.e. 
information signifying that there is a giant 
rabbit in front of me “out there” in the 
world).  
In thought insertion, the patient 
“…experiences thoughts that do not have the 
feeling of being his own, but he feels that 
they have been put into his mind without his 
own volition, from the outside” (Sims, 1995; 
Stephens and Graham, 2007; Globus, 2010).  
When looked at in terms of information, it 
has been suggested by Frith (1992) that 
thought insertion essentially involves lack of 
information about volition or intention 
behind thoughts. For some reason the 
patient lacks information that he or she has 
intended certain thoughts appearing in his or 
her mind, and further attributes them to 
having been produced by someone else. Frith 
suggests that this might involve a breakdown 
in the system that monitors whether the 
subject intended to think a given thought. 
Stephens and Graham describe the idea 
succinctly: “Pathological impairments of this 
monitoring system might lead me to 
experience my intended thoughts as 
stimulus-driven responses to external events 
and thus not as mine.”  This explanation has 
an air of plausibility, but is it 
phenomenologically fully accurate?  Frith 
writes: “If we found ourselves thinking 
without any awareness of the sense of effort 
that reflects central monitoring, we might 
well experience these thoughts as alien and, 
thus, being inserted into our minds” (1992: 
81, quoted in Stephens and Graham, 2007; 
p.202).  However, it is at least my experience 
that thoughts often just “unfold”, without 
any sense of effort or deliberate choice (e.g. 
when one is driving a car, or thinking while 
also engaging in some other activity; or just 
“lost in thought” while relaxing); yet one 
does not typically experience these thoughts 
as alien.  But there are also thoughts which 
typically require more effort and deliberate 
choice for their production; and if such 
thoughts should appear in my mind without 
my having any sense of having produced 
them, they might well feel alien, in line with 
Frith’s explanation. One should also be open 
to the possibility that something more subtle 
might be going on in thought insertion, 
perhaps something more like Globus’s 
“integration failure of the self-tuning 
function” which gives rise to the splitting of 
agency at a deeper level. 
Some explanations of misattributions 
might be offered by neural studies: 
“…electrophysiological studies recently 
conducted by Ford and Mathalon (2004) 
found … that talking and inner speech 
resulted in a dampening of responsivity of 
the auditory perception areas in the 
temporal lobes (a process that they identified 
as indicating a corollary discharge from the 
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frontal cortex which prevents one’s own 
speech from being attributed externally) but 
not in hallucinating patients” (Bentall, 2007; 
p.135). This is an example of how a 
mechanistic explanation (emphasizing the 
role of separate parts/areas and their 
connection/interaction) might play a useful 
role in understanding mental disorders.  
Such explanations need to be compared and 
contrasted with the more exotic, quantum 
brain dynamical models of “mental 
splitting”, such as that offered by Globus 
(2010).  
Common psychiatric disorders such 
as depression and anxiety can also be seen to 
involve information in an essential way. 
According to Bentall (2007; p.132), evidence 
suggests that “…they are associated with 
systematic biases in the extent to which 
different kinds of stimuli become available to 
awareness. For example, […] depressed 
patients preferentially recall negative 
information […], whereas feelings of anxiety 
are associated with excessive attention to 
threat-related stimuli”. Further, obsessional 
problems, too, can be understood as 
essentially connected to the way we respond 
to and try to control information, as Bentall 
(2007; p.132) points out: “Unwanted, 
intrusive thoughts (e.g., about embarrassing 
past experiences) seem to be an almost 
universal phenomenon and obsessional 
patients appear to differ from ordinary 
people in their catastrophizing response to 
these kinds of experiences” (Salkovskis, 
1998). 
Thus, it seems clear that many 
mental disorders essentially involve 
information, and more specifically lack of 
information, mistaken information 
(misattribution) and various kinds of failures 
to respond to and control information 
adequately.  Can quantum theory throw any 
new light upon the nature of information, 
which might also help us to understand the 
role of information in psychiatric disorders?  
I suggest that the best place to start 
exploring this issue is David Bohm’s 
ontological interpretation of quantum 
theory, some features of which will now be 
briefly described (for an extensive 
presentation see Bohm and Hiley, 1993).   
One of the famous questions in 
quantum theory concerns the nature of 
quantum systems, such as electrons.  Is an 
electron a particle or a field?  This question 
arises because in classical physics it is a basic 
point that elementary systems are typically 
either particles (such as atoms) or fields 
(such as the electromagnetic). However, in a 
typical quantum experiment (such as the 
two-slit interference experiment) an 
individual system exhibits both particle 
properties (it arrives at the detector at a 
single spot) and wave properties (the place 
where the spot appears is determined by the 
mathematics of wave behaviour). Bohm’s 
interpretation resolves this duality by 
postulating that an electron is a new kind of 
entity that has always both a particle aspect 
and a wave aspect.  To simplify the 
discussion let us say that the electron is a 
particle always accompanied and guided by a 
new type of field.  
In the two-slit experiment, when both 
slits are open, the particle goes through one 
of the slits, and then appears at a point in a 
photographic place (which explains why we 
see the appearance of a spot - note especially 
that in this interpretation there is no need to 
assume that there is a collapse of the wave 
function). The accompanying field goes 
through both slits, interferes afterwards, and 
guides the movement of the particle so that 
the particles collectively, spot by spot, build 
up an interference pattern. The key feature 
for our discussion is that according to Bohm 
the quantum field contains something he 
calls “active information”.  The quantum 
field typically contains information about the 
entire environment of the particle (e.g. slits) 
and is able to mediate this to the particle. 
The field gives rise to a potential, which 
Bohm called the “quantum potential”. The 
radically new feature is that this field does 
not push and pull the particle mechanically; 
rather the influence of the field upon the 
particle only depends upon the form of the 
field (mathematically the quantum potential 
depends on the second spatial derivative of 
the quantum field, which reflects the shape 
of the field).  If you like, the field literally IN-
FORMS (or puts form into) the energy of the 
particle. This influence should not, however, 
be understood in too mechanical terms. 
What is involved is not a mere form imposed 
from without.  The active information 
contained in the quantum field can rather be 
seen as an ordered and structured “inner” 
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movement that is essential to what the 
electron as a whole (i.e. as a union of a 
particle and a field) is (cf. Bohm 1980; p.12).  
Information is a key factor of the being of an 
electron. In Bohmian quantum field theory, 
this idea is even more fundamental, for 
information contained in the so-called 
“super-quantum” field plays a key role in the 
creation, sustenance and annihilation of 
“particles”. 
The relevant idea here is that 
information is an important part of the 
essence of physical processes.  Something 
like this is at least implicitly recognized in 
biology, where information contained in the 
DNA-molecule is assumed an important 
generative part of the essence of the 
organism. In addition, of course, as we come 
to the psychological domain, it seems 
obvious that information is a key factor of 
mental phenomena. This has, of course, been 
recognized in cognitive science, with its 
assumption that the human brain/mind can 
be seen as a system that receives and stores 
information, and uses such information in 
the intelligent control of behaviour. Bohm’s 
radical suggestion is that there is at least a 
strong analogy between the operation of 
information at the quantum level, and the 
operation of information at the various levels 
of mind. 
We saw above that the suggestion is 
that at the quantum level information acts – 
it actively guides the movement of particles.  
Similarly, in human subjective experience, 
information content acts. When I see 
something that in a given context means 
“danger” (e.g. a snake), this information 
content acts within the brain, not only via 
electric action potentials, but also via various 
neurochemical processes to prepare the body 
for appropriate response (cf. Thagard 
(2002)).  Bohm emphasizes that “…this is 
not merely a mental process, but includes an 
involuntary and essentially unconscious 
process of hormones, heart-beat, and 
neurochemicals of various kinds, as well as 
physical tensions and movements” (1990). 
But how does information content act upon 
matter? How does such an abstract quality as 
the experienced meaning of information 
(e.g., “danger”) result in a wide range of 
electrical and chemical processes in the 
brain?  
This question is very difficult to 
answer in contemporary philosophy of mind, 
which is still based upon a very strict division 
between the categories “physical” and 
“mental” (Kim, 2006). Meaning is typically 
considered to be located at the “mental” side 
of the division, and there is currently no 
coherent theory that explains how meaning 
qua meaning can influence physical 
processes.  It is assumed that meanings are 
typically carried by some physical “vehicles”, 
and any causal influences associated with 
meaning are assumed to be the result of the 
operation of the physical vehicle that carries 
the content or meaning.  The meaning itself 
is assumed to be causally inefficacious. 
Bohm’s approach changes this in a 
subtle way. Notice that in Bohm’s model of 
the electron, the information is carried by 
the quantum field that is a qualitatively new 
type of field in physics (it has some very 
exotic properties; not only does it influence 
the movement of particles via its form, it also 
lives in a multidimensional configuration 
space and is able to mediate Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen type non-local influences 
between particles). Thus we have a more 
subtle aspect (information in the quantum 
field) guiding the behaviour of a more 
manifest aspect (the particle). We could 
generalize this to a principle that applies 
whenever meaning influences matter in 
other contexts. Bohm proposed such a 
principle and called it “soma-significance”.  
In this terminology a process in which 
meaning organizes the manifest levels of 
matter is called a “signa-somatic” process.  
Thus, in the context of the human 
mind we could speculate that information 
contained in mental processes and conscious 
experience is carried by some subtle 
medium.  Of course, it seems likely that a 
great deal of information that enters 
consciousness is at some stage carried by 
neurophysiological processes that exist at the 
“classical level” of reality (e.g. in processes 
where quantum effects have a negligible 
effect).  But it is possible that the 
information that is experienced in 
consciousness is carried by some much more 
subtle medium, analogous to the quantum 
field, but capable of much more complex 
properties, including qualia, subjectivity and 
conscious experience.  This information then 
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typically “acts downwards” toward the 
manifest levels of the brain, ultimately 
guiding behaviour.  But how could such a 
“very subtle” field carrying information 
possibly be able to act upon the more 
manifest processes e.g. in the motor cortex?  
One possibility is that it would act via the 
quantum field.  Indeed, Bohm (1990) writes:  
“…that which we experience as mind, in 
its movement through various levels of 
subtlety, will, in a natural way ultimately 
move the body by reaching to the level of 
the quantum potential and of the ‘dance’ 
of the particles. There is no unbridgeable 
gap or barrier between any of these 
levels. Rather, at each stage some kind of 
information is the bridge. This implies 
that the quantum potential acting on 
atomic particles, for example, represents 
only one stage in the process.” 
Bohm was not too specific about what 
he meant by the “various levels of subtlety”.  
Are these new types of fields, similar to but 
more complex than the quantum field? Or 
can they include levels of processing in the 
more classical domains of brain function 
(e.g. the various levels of processing of visual 
information)?  I think Bohm’s view was quite 
inclusive; he did not deny the obvious role 
which classically describable processes play 
in the processing of information that enters 
consciousness (Bohm & Hiley, 1993; p.179). 
However, I also think he felt that the more 
subtle aspects of mind and conscious 
experience involve more subtle levels of 
information, which have not yet been 
discovered by cognitive neuroscience.  The 
discovery of the quantum potential is very 
important as a first guide to what the nature 
of such more subtle levels could be. Indeed, 
Bohm suggested that by extending the 
ontological interpretation in a natural way, 
we could include the subtle mental aspects 
into the theory. But how can such an 
extension be done? 
“… one could begin by supposing, for 
example, that as the quantum potential 
constitutes active information that can 
give form to the movements of the 
particles, so there is a superquantum 
potential that can give form to the 
unfoldment and development of this first 
order quantum potential. This latter 
would no longer satisfy the laws of the 
current quantum theory, which latter 
would then be an approximation, 
working only when the action of the 
superquantum potential can be 
neglected. Of course, there is no reason 
to stop here. One could go on to suppose 
a series of orders of superquantum 
potentials, with each order constituting 
information that gives form to the 
activity of the next lower order (which is 
less subtle)” (Bohm, 1990). 
 
This, then, is a schematic view of the 
way “mind acts on matter” in Bohm’s 
extended ontological interpretation of the 
quantum theory.  In my view, it is to date the 
most elegant attempt to tackle the problem 
Descartes left behind himself: how can mind 
and matter, which seem so completely 
different, nevertheless manage to influence 
each other?  Bohm’s solution has two parts.  
On the one hand he argues on the basis of 
quantum theory that matter has far more 
subtle properties than Western mechanistic 
science has thus far assumed. On the other 
hand he suggests that minds are very subtle 
but adds that it is a mistake to assume that 
minds are entirely non-physical.  Instead he 
assumes that every mental process has a 
subtle physical aspect which carries the 
information that is part of the essence of that 
process.   Quantum theory is important even 
for this second hypothesis, for quantum 
theory makes plausible the idea that it is 
possible for there to exist very subtle 
physical processes. In Bohm’s extended 
quantum theory, these physical processes are 
assumed so subtle that they can justifiably be 
characterized as “mental” (for a further 
discussion of this view see Pylkkänen 2007; 
for a critical review see Globus 2007). 
 
4. The possible role of active 
information in psychiatric disorders 
What might be the relevance of Bohm’s 
ontological interpretation of quantum theory 
to psychiatry, what might a “Bohmian 
quantum psychiatry” look like?  It would 
clearly approach mental disorder from the 
perspective of active information.  We saw 
above briefly how psychiatric disorder 
essentially seems to involve failures in the 
flow of information, and in the response to 
information. Bohm’s emphasis on the idea 
that information is typically active seems to 
be very useful if we want to understand how 
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various failures at the level of information 
lead to psychiatric disorders.   
In hallucinations self-generated 
information is mistaken for externally 
produced information; as a result this 
information acts to give rise to a perception 
of, say, a giant rabbit.  This perception, in 
turn, can give rise to all sorts of reactions in 
the person, as the state of the body unfolds 
the meaning in subtler levels of thought.  
We saw earlier that it has been 
suggested that thought insertion involves a 
breakdown in the system that monitors 
whether one intends to think certain 
thoughts, which can result in misattributions 
of these thoughts to external agents.  This 
suggests that our sense of agency depends 
upon the presence and activity of a certain 
kind of information, namely (what seems to 
be a kind of) self-referential information 
about our own intentions.  Usually we are 
not aware of the activity of this kind of 
information, but only realize its importance 
when considering puzzling clinical cases 
such as thought insertion. 
We also considered the idea that 
“…depressed patients preferentially recall 
negative information compared to positive 
information…” (Bentall, 2007; p.132). In 
Bohmian terms, this could be seen as a 
situation in which for some reason negative 
information is “overactive” while the 
meaning of positive information is inhibited 
from entering into awareness – positive 
information has become somewhat 
“inactive”.    
Bentall further suggests “…feelings of 
anxiety are associated with excessive 
attention to threat-related stimuli”, as in 
panic disorder. In Bohmian terms anxiety 
can be understood as a failure to deal with 
active information. While a ‘normal’ person 
can usually deal fairly calmly with different 
types of information, the person with an 
anxiety disorder cannot very well deal with 
the information consisting of certain kinds of 
stimuli, and as a result a panic attack can be 
triggered. Panic attacks are an example of 
the power of information to act, whether or 
not the “subject” likes or intends it. Would 
an increased understanding and awareness 
of this relatively autonomous power of 
information help to relate to information in 
such a way as to control that power? It is an 
interesting question whether an increased 
understanding of the active nature of 
information along Bohmian lines could help 
to develop therapeutic techniques that in 
turn could help to tackle anxiety and even 
depression. I will return to this issue at the 
end of the article. 
We noted above that obsessional 
problems, too, could be understood as 
essentially connected to the way we respond 
to information. Recall Bentall: “Unwanted, 
intrusive thoughts (e.g., about embarrassing 
past experiences) seem to be an almost 
universal phenomenon and obsessional 
patients appear to differ from ordinary 
people in their catastrophizing response to 
these kinds of experiences”.  Bentall suggests 
that obsessional patients are dysfunctional in 
their attempts to control the contents of 
consciousness.  It seems that ‘normal” 
people are able to deal with their unwanted, 
intrusive thoughts in a fairly calm way.  In 
contrast, Bentall (2007; p.132) points out 
that obsessional patients have “…excessive 
expectations about their mental efficiency, 
catastrophic fears about losing control of 
their thoughts, and superstitious beliefs 
about the consequences of this happening 
(“If I did not control a worrying thought, and 
then what I worried about really happened, it 
would be my fault”) (Wells and Papageorgiu, 
1998)”.  The worry here seems to be, at least 
in part, about the active and autonomous 
power of thoughts, and the sense of a need to 
control this power. 
 
5. NeuroQuantal considerations 
We saw above how Bohm suggested 
schematically that “…that which we 
experience as mind, in its movement through 
various levels of subtlety, will, in a natural 
way ultimately move the body by reaching to 
the level of the quantum potential and of the 
‘dance’ of the particles.”   In other words, 
“mind” involves a hierarchy of “levels of 
subtlety”, which includes the level of the 
quantum potential at the bottom of the 
hierarchy. By controlling the shape of the 
quantum field, the “mind” can control the 
movement of particles, such as electrons.  
Electrons, in turn, can control more 
macroscopic, classical neural behaviour via 
amplification of quantum effects.  
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Alternatively, in a quantum field theoretic 
model, the mind can control the behaviour of 
e.g. the electromagnetic field by controlling 
the form of the super-quantum field. This is 
the naïve idea, or the general principle. To 
implement the principle into concrete 
neuroquantal models we need to look for 
sites in the brain, where amplification of 
quantum effects is likely to play a role in 
determining more macroscopic neural 
behaviour (e.g. resulting in the activation of 
motor neurons). Hiley and Pylkkänen (2005) 
considered Beck & Eccles’s quantum model 
of synaptic exocytosis (Beck, 2008) from the 
point of view of the ontological 
interpretation. We wrote there: “…[the] 
action of the quantum potential effectively 
reduces the height of the barrier to increase 
the probability of exocytosis. Thus we could 
regard the “mind-field” as initiating a 
subsequent neural process which finally 
activates the motor neurons to produce the 
outward behaviour. In this sense, active 
information is merely the trigger for the 
usual classical processes that follow the 
gating of ion channels.”  Later on, we added: 
“There may be other brain processes where 
the notion of active information could be 
more appropriate. One suggestion that we 
presently investigate is the behaviour of 
dendritic fields, where it has been suggested 
that important information processing may 
be going on (Pribram 2004). Here statistical 
processes involving active information may 
be important, as discussed in a preliminary 
way by Hiley (2004).” 
In recent years, much attention has 
been given to the idea that quantum 
processes in neural microtubules might be 
essentially connected with higher cognitive 
functions and even conscious experience.  It 
is tempting to consider the microtubules 
from the point of view of the ontological 
interpretation of quantum theory. For 
example, standard quantum theory has no 
clear notion about what an individual 
electron is (i.e. it has no coherent ontology).  
Thus, for example, when we try to consider 
an electron being in a tubulin dimer, 
standard quantum theory provides us with 
no clear ontological picture of the situation. 
In contrast, Bohm’s ontological 
interpretation provides, in principle, an 
unambiguous model of the electron in the 
dimer. If one could calculate the quantum 
potential for this situation, one could look at 
the behaviour of the electron in the dimer, 
and study in a more concrete way how the 
effects of the electron behaviour might be 
amplified to control more macroscopic 
neural behaviour.  In the Bohmian mind-
matter scheme, the microtubules are one 
possible site where the quantum field might 
persist in a form that could be influenced by 
mind (when the latter understood as 
involving a hierarchy of super-quantum 
fields).  The changes in the form of the 
quantum field in the relevant microtubules 
would result in the change of the behaviour 
of the electrons, which in turn might, in 
principle, be amplified to control large-scale 
neuronal behaviour.   
Of course, to account for cognition we 
also need to discuss perception, where 
(typically) information about the manifest, 
classical world is carried toward the more 
subtle, quantum levels.  This requires that 
the Bohmian scheme is modified to include 
“back-action”, i.e. an influence from the 
particle to its guiding quantum field (or in 
the field theory from e.g. the electromagnetic 
field to its guiding super-quantum field). The 
need for this has been emphasized especially 
by Jack Sarfatti, and here is a sample of his 
take on developing Bohmian mind-matter 
theory in the context of microtubules: “…the 
back-action of the electro-chemical signals, 
from the nerve cells via the [tubulin] dimers, 
on the wavefunction of the collective 
Fröhlich mode provides the information 
stream required for perception. The reverse 
quantum force of the wavefunction on the 
nerve matter is the action stream for intent 
(volition or free will). The two opposing 
streams of bits, nerve matter to mental 
wavefunction and vice versa, form a new 
kind of feedback-control loop which is 
absent in dead matter…” 
An eager and able defender of 
Bohm’s ontological interpretation of 
quantum theory is Mike Towler of Cavendish 
Laboratory, Cambridge University.  He 
writes in his 2009 lecture slides:  
“Experimentalists have been able to ‘diffract’ 
60 C-atom fullerene molecules passing 
through small holes, so such objects 
definitely fall on the quantum side of the 
classical-quantum boundary. The TCM 
group in Cambridge is a leading centre for 
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doing molecular dynamics (e.g. with the 
CASTEP code). So if trajectories don’t exist, 
and particles don’t have objective reality, 
what exactly do we imagine our molecular 
dynamics movies are depicting?”.  Towler is 
referring to the fact that standard quantum 
theory allows for neither the notion of 
particles existing when not observed, nor for 
the notion that particles move along 
trajectories.  In contrast, the ontological 
interpretation provides a mathematically 
precise hypothesis of what might be going on 
at the level of, say, 60 C-atom fullerene 
molecular motion. At least in principle, the 
ontological interpretation should also make 
it possible to make movies about “electron 
dynamics in the microtubules”, and such 
visualizations might well be useful as we try 
to understand microtubules better.  I admit 
that such suggestions are very general and 
vague, no doubt reflecting my limited 
knowledge of this area, but I have a strong 
intuition that more attention to the 
ontological interpretation ought to be given 
in the research on the role of microtubules in 
quantum mind theories.  At the very least, 
this would complement the pictures offered 
by the two other paradigms, the Penrose-
Hameroff Orch-or theory and the TBD 
theory. On the whole, Towler’s lectures 
provide an excellent overview of the different 
aspects of the “deBroglie-Bohm theory” (as 
the ontological interpretation is often called), 
and I highly recommend the reader to visit 
the website of the course (Towler, 2009). 
The prominent role Bohm’s 
interpretation gives to information makes it 
at least prima facie a very strong candidate 
to be considered in attempts to develop 
quantum mind theories. It is almost 
universally accepted that information is a 
key factor of mental processes.  If 
information also plays a key role in guiding 
quantum processes, there is at least 
potentially a new kind of connection between 
mental processes and physical processes at a 
very fundamental level.  Different quantum 
mind theories postulate different reasons 
why quantum theory might be relevant to 
understanding the mind-brain relationship.  
The possibility that information plays an 
objective and active role at the quantum level 
certainly adds to the initial plausibility of 
quantum mind theories (see also Smith, 
2002; for criticisms of the active information 
at the quantum level hypothesis, see e.g. 
Riggs, 2009; for an early discussion of the 
issues that Riggs considers, see Hiley, 1994). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Let us return to our discussion of what might 
be the relevance of Bohm’s partly quantum-
inspired theorizing about information in a 
psychiatric context. Firstly, we remember 
that Bohm draws attention to the idea that 
information should be seen as typically 
active, even if we typically may see 
information as a fairly passive entity that we 
are free and able to manipulate at will.  We 
have seen above how many psychiatric 
disorders can be seen as connected to 
information and our response to it.  Our 
failure to perceive and understand the active 
nature of the various kinds of information in 
our mental lives might well explain some of 
these disorders. This is at least implicitly 
understood in cognitive behaviour therapy, 
where one has developed clinical techniques 
that try to manipulate cognitive processes 
that seem to give rise to disorders. Bentall 
(2007; p.38) writes: “Most cognitive 
behavioural interventions involve 
challenging the dysfunctional belief systems 
of patients, and these approaches have 
shown considerable promise in the 
treatment of both the common psychiatric 
disorders and also the psychoses (Rector & 
Beck, 2001).” Also in the Bohmian picture it 
seems that incoherent information – which 
constantly appears in cognition - plays a key 
role in mental disorder, and thus the road to 
mental health is the movement toward 
coherence. However, challenging incoherent 
beliefs may not be the only way to tackle 
them. Indeed, Bentall (2007; p.138) 
observers:  “…there has been recent interest 
in the development of strategies to help 
patients change their attitude toward their 
thoughts and feelings, rather than the 
thoughts and feelings themselves. These 
approaches, which have borrowed from the 
mindfulness meditation techniques 
developed within the Buddhist tradition, 
have shown especial promise in the 
treatment of patients with chronic, recurring 
conditions (Segal et al., 2002)”.   
In Bohmian terms this would involve 
trying to be aware of the meaning of the 
active information contained in the various 
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incoherent and disturbing thoughts, without 
accepting or condemning this content.  The 
idea is that this very awareness is able to 
reveal to the mind that these contents lack 
coherent meaning, and in such awareness, 
these incoherent meanings dissolve. Bohm’s 
approach is similar to that of Krishnamurti, 
with whom he had many discussions. 
Krishnamurti spoke of “choiceless 
awareness” in this context, but Bohm felt 
that the use of the term “choice” was not very 
apt here. Rather, it is the question of being 
able to be aware of the meaning of the 
various mental states, without judging them 
(this reminds one of Pyrrhonian skepticism, 
which held that such suspension of judgment 
is an important means to achieving peace of 
mind).  Thus, one does not “argue with” 
incoherent thoughts – that might just 
produce more confusion.  Instead, when 
trying to understand their meaning, one 
might be able to perceive their incoherence, 
and this very perception might start a 
movement toward coherence (Bohm and 
Pylkkänen, 1991). 
In this article, I have with some 
enthusiasm and optimism considered the 
possible role Bohm’s notion of active 
information could play for a better 
understanding of psychiatric disorders.  Of 
course, there is a great danger of being overly 
naïve about the extent of the relevance of this 
notion.  The fruitful way of making use of the 
notion of active information in this context is 
not to try to replace existing approaches to 
psychiatric disorder by a theory based on 
this notion. Rather, the notion of active 
information can be used to sharpen up the 
views provided by existing theories.  In 
particular, this notion draws attention to the 
way information content acts to organize the 
lower, physiological levels of the brain, and 
how changes in these lower levels can, in 
turn, cause changes in the higher cognitive 
levels.  This idea, I think, is potentially very 
important for understanding the mind-
matter relation in general and psychiatric 
disorders in particular.  
One of the advantages of Globus’s 
TBD scheme is that he has connected it to 
the hermeneutical-phenomenological 
philosophical tradition, which includes a 
very sophisticated way of understanding the 
human condition. This allows Globus to 
make use of, say, and Heidegger’s 
philosophical notions in a quantum 
neuropsychiatric context. Much further work 
needs to be done if the active information 
scheme is likewise to be properly connected 
to the various more humanistic schemes that 
have proved successful in the attempts to 
understand psychiatric disorders. In 
addition, the neuroquantal implementation 
of the Bohmian scheme is still at very early 
stages. In this paper, we have only been 
scratching the surface of “quantum 
psychiatry” from a Bohmian perspective, but 
hopefully we have been able to show that the 
idea is at least worthy of further 
development. 
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